Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP

Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/18/84; site Shasta.ARPA

Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!mhuxr!mhuxt!houxm!whuxl!whuxlm!akgua!gatech!seismo!cmcl2!harvard!talcott!panda!genrad!decvax!decwrl!glacier!Shasta!gus

From: gus@Shasta.ARPA

Newsgroups: net.micro.mac

Subject: Re: bozo bit?

Message-ID: <1585@Shasta.ARPA>

Date: Wed, 11-Dec-85 23:22:11 EST

Article-I.D.: Shasta.1585

Posted: Wed Dec 11 23:22:11 1985

Date-Received: Sun, 15-Dec-85 00:30:42 EST

References: <2129@aecom.UUCP>

Distribution: net

Organization: Stanford University

Lines: 72

> Can someone explain to me what the bozo finder file bit is for?

The "bozo" bit in the MFS really doesn't do much of anything. It is where the

finder stores an in-memory copy of the copy protection bit. It turns out

that there are TWO flags words in the directory: one maintained by the finder

and the other by the file system. Ironically however, the only programs that

really honor the copy protection flag are the finder and the old 128K four

pass disk copier. The SetFile utility from Apple only gives you access to

the "finder information" area of each directory entry. Newer programs also

give you access to the C.P. bit.

The "bozo's" are those people without any reasonable tools to deal with this

sort of thing. Reasonable tools being Disk Util (Larry Kenyon's program),

FEDIT, Copy II Mac, or any of the 512K mass disk copiers. The 128K four

pass copier really has to go out of its way to detect that at least one of

the files on the disk is copy protected using this bit. I believe that there

is also a "global" copy protection bit somewhere in the volume header. I

don't know if it is actually used or not.

In any case, all of this shows the futility of building copy protection into

the operating system. As soon as a C.P. system is well understood, there are

tools designed immediately to defeat it. Any organized attempt to copy

protect more than one program in the same way makes all programs in such a

group vulnerable as soon as one is defeated. The Electronic Arts scheme I

described some weeks ago is a perfect example.

This situation creates an environment where anyone who is serious about C.P.

must "Re-invent the wheel." This leads to general chaos as developers must

devise ways to use undocumented features in the system. Apple DOES provide

some information to certified developers about how copy protection works on

the Mac. Unfortunately, Apple must necessarily not provide too much

information to too many people. Thus the most important products from the

largest companies get the most help. Smaller companies must either fend for

themselves or go to an outside contracter.

Companies that strike out on their own tend to make mistakes. These are the

sort of mistakes that inhibit HFS compatibility, or keep programs from

running on a Mac XL. Such programs will almost certainly NOT work with future

Mac architectures. This is a problem that will hamper Apple's ability to come

out with new products and still retain compatibility with a large portion of

the existing software base.

Companies who go to outside contractors must realize that any copy protection

house must provide a similar protection system to several clients in order

to keep the cost of such systems down to a minimum. I have heared stories of

$35 games serving as key disks for $250 business programs.

Hardware key systems will solve most of these problems if and when.

1) They become available

2) They become a built-in feature of the machine and not just an add-on

kluge.

3) They become very inexpensive to produce so that inclusion of a key

does not add significantly to even the least expensive

pacages.

Unfortunately, the first two criteria do not hold true today, and it remains

to be seen what the cost of such keys will be.

I have no doubt that a protection system using such keys can be cracked

unless 1) An important part of the program is in the key and executed there.

(This means puting a processor and a fair amount of ROM in the key) or

2) The key destroys itself if it suspects tampering. This would be rather

dangerous as some spurious signal could inadvertently erase the key and would

thus not be used any more than a copy protection system that sprinkles random

bits in memory if it smells something fishy. (Killer Prolok) I can emagine a

stong case for a user sueing a software company because valuable data was

lost when a nasty copy protection system triggered its "alarm."

On the other hand, there is no legal commercial market for defeating hardware

copy protection systems that do not otherwise impeed normal work as there is

for software copy protection. You will NOT see any "copy II Mac/key" sold

legally simply because itt could be proved that any attempt to use such a

product constitutes an attempt to make an unauthorized copy.

Click to expand...